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trates its principles.7 ' Although the validity of this decision is questionable,
it does cloud a court of civil appeals' ability to set aside void orders. This,
together with the supreme court's willingness to grant mandamus-even
when the order may be remedied by appeal 7 -makes the mandamus route
the most assured means of correcting the void order.
Gary A. Scarzafava
CRIMINAL LAW-Self-Incrimination-Failure To
Relate Exculpatory Story at Pretrial Hearings
May Be Used by Prosecution To Impeach
Defendant's Testimony at Trial
Franklin v. State,
No. 57,348 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en banc)(not yet reported).
Donald Gene Franklin was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced
to death. At the trial Franklin took the stand and related an exculpatory
story. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Franklin several questions' concerning Franklin's failure to relate this story at the pretrial hearings.2 Defense counsel objected, pointing out that the pretrial testimony
had been limited by agreement of the parties to collateral points unrelated
to the issue of guilt. The objections were overruled. On appeal to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, Franklin contended that the trial court erred
in permitting cross-examination concerning Franklin's failure to testify
about exculpatory matters at pretrial hearings.' Held-Affirmed. A defenwrit)(ordinarily no right to appeal from interlocutory order, but rule different when order
void).
74. See Crick, The FinalJudgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 539-40 (1932);
Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 292, 292-93 (1966).
75. See Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 358, 346 S.W.2d 823, 828 (1961).
1. Mr. Conaway, one of the prosecuting attorneys, asked the question, "Isn't it true that
you have been under oath in a Courtroom before Judge Barlow in previous proceedings and
you never told us one mumbling word about the tale you just told me?" This question and
several like it were repeated on many occasions. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip. op. at 4
(Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en banc)(not yet reported). The "tale" that Franklin related
at trial was that a man named Eugene Tealer had borrowed Franklin's car and pants on the
night of the incident in question. Franklin contended that although his car may have been
seen in the parking lot from which the victim of the murder was abducted, Tealer was the
driver of the car. Id. at 5.
2. The pretrial hearings were conducted solely to resolve the contentions that Franklin
was not competent to assist his attorneys at the pretrial hearings, that he was not properly
represented by an attorney at a police line-up, and that evidence was obtained against him
in violation of his fourth amendment rights. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip. op. at 9-10
(Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion).
3. Forty-five points of error were presented on appeal to the court of criminal appeals.
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dant's failure to relate an exculpatory story during pretrial hearings may
be used by the prosecution to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial.'

A defendant's right to remain silent without that silence being used
against him has been a part of American jurisprudence since the adoption

of the Bill of Rights. 5 While this right was originally afforded only to
defendants in federal criminal proceedings,' it has been extended to the
states through the fourteenth amendment,' as well as to defendants in civil
proceedings.'
Historically, this right has undergone substantial modification, particu-

larly during this century.' The United States Supreme Court has narrowed
the scope of the privilege against impeachment by one's own silence, holding that although a defendant had the right to remain silent, he waived
this right when he took the stand on his own behalf."0 Thus, while no

inference of guilt could be drawn from a defendant's refusal to testify, he

had no right to relate to the jury all the facts favorable to his case without

being vulnerable to cross-examination." Further, a refusal to answer a
proper question upon cross-examination was a permissible subject of com-

ment to the jury. 2 As the -Court noted, the privilege against selfincrimination was afforded only to those who did not wish to become
witnesses in their own behalf. 3 In Mirandav. Arizona" the Supreme Court

Only three of those points deal with the issue of the use of pretrial silence to impeach
testimony at trial. See id. at 1-9.
4. Id.at 5.
5. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 552(1892); U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally C. McCoRmICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 114-143 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WiMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2250
(Chadbourn rev. 1972).
6. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 48 (1947).
7. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1964); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. See also Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 184 (1954)(concurring opinion)(testimony
by witness in congressional inquiry could not later be used against witness in subsequent
case).
8. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390(1968)(evidence given in support of motion to suppress not admissible at trial); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499
(1926) (privilege against self-incrimination extends only to trial at which defendant asserts it);
Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 316 (1900)(refusal to answer proper question on
cross-examination permissible subject for comment to jury).
10. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 318
U.S. 189, 196 (1943); Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900). When a defendant
takes the stand on his own behalf, the prosecutor may cross-examine him in the same manner
as he would any other witness. Id. at 315; see Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498 (1926);
Black v. State, 440 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). See generally C. MCCoRMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 132 (2d ed. 1972).
11. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).
12. Id. at 316. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276(b) (Chadbourn rev. 1972);
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 132 (2d ed. 1972).
13. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926). In Raffel, the defendant did
not offer himself as a witness at the first trial and the jury failed to reach a verdict. At the
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clearly stated not only that a defendant has the right to remain silent, but
that the state must affirmatively demonstrate that procedural safeguards
have been employed to insure that the defendant is aware of this right.'5
Prosecutors are prohibited from using statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless the Miranda warnings have been given.'

Although it is well settled that a defendant normally waives his right to
remain silent when he takes the witness stand," an exception is made when
he takes the stand to assert a fourth amendment claim to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure." Since this right is personal in nature, a
defendant will usually have to take the witness stand to assert it." In so
doing, he may make statements tending to incriminate himself, which, if
admissible at trial on the issue of guilt, would require the defendant to
either give up what he believed to be a valid fourth amendment claim or,
in legal effect, waive his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination."
When a defendant invokes his right to remain silent at the time of his
arrest, his silence cannot be used to impeach his credibility at trial if he
testifies in his own behalf.' In most cases, silence is so ambiguous that it
has little probative force.22 Nevertheless, when a defendant is repeatedly
second trial, the defendant took the stand and offered into evidence some exculpatory information. The court asked the defendant several questions probing for the reason he did not
offer this evidence at the first trial. The second trial resulted in a conviction. Id. at 495-96. A
challenge was made to the court's questioning of the defendant about his failure to previously
mention the exculpatory story. The Supreme Court's affirmance of the conviction indicates
that the privilege against self-incrimination extends only to the trial in which the defendant
asserts it. Id. at 499. See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 132 (2d
ed. 1972). In a later case, it was held that even when the privilege to remain silent was
mistakenly granted, the defendant has a right to rely on the court's assurance that the
privilege is intact. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943).
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. Id. at 444.
16. See id. at 444. An accused must be advised that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Id. at 444. But see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 225 (1971) (approved use of statements for impeachment purposes, although obtained
in violation of Miranda).
17. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S.
494, 499 (1926); see Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943).
18. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); U.S. CoNssr. amend. IV.
See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 131 (2d ed. 1972).
19. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968).
20. Id. at 394.
21. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1968).
22. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618
(1976).
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accused of a crime and does not attempt to rebut his accusers, his failure
to speak becomes less ambiguous and more probative. It is assumed that
a defendant would be likely to speak out in his defense when falsely accused." Generally, the Supreme Court has construed the fifth amendment
to forbid both comment by the prosecutor on the accused's silence and
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."
In Doyle v. Ohio3 the Supreme Court addressed the issue whether a
prosecutor may properly cross-examine a defendant about his failure to
relate an exculpatory story after receiving the Miranda warnings.2 The
Court held that this use of the defendant's post-arrest silence violates
due process. 21 In so holding, the Court declared that every post-arrest
silence is "insolubly ambiguous" in that the Miranda warnings impliedly
contain the guarantee that an arrestee's silence will not be used against
8
2

him..

In Franklin v. States the majority, in holding that the prosecutor's repeated references to Franklin's failure to relate an exculpatory story at
pretrial hearings were not error, reasoned that Franklin could have told the
same exculpatory story at the pretrial hearings that he offered into evidence at trial. The holding carries the further implication that Franklin
should have told his story at the pretrial hearings, and his failure to do so
could be used to impeach his testimony at trial ° The majority cited to
Raffel v. United States,3 a 1926 Supreme Court case in which a defendant's failure to relate an exculpatory story at his first trial was used to
impeach his testimony at a retrial.3 2 No attempt was made to relate the
facts in Raffel to Franklin.Additionally, the majority relied on a footnote
in Doyle which indicated that prosecutors should be allowed great latitude
in their cross-examinations to prevent defendants from frustrating the
truth-seeking function of a trial.3
23. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617
(1976). See generally 3A J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
24. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943); Raffel v. United States,
271 U.S. 494, 498 (1926). See generally Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422-23
(1957)(identified three factors relating to whether silence is inconsistent with later exculpatory testimony); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
25. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
26. Id. at 611.
27. Id. at 611. In Doyle the dissent pointed out that this was the first decision of the
Supreme Court to address the constitutionality of admitting evidence of a defendant's prior
silence to impeach his testimony upon direct examination since Raffel v. United States, in
1926. Id. at 632-33 n.11 (dissenting opinion). Cases subsequent to Raffel had been decided
on evidentiary rather than constitutional grounds, and had diminished the force of Raffel in
the federal courts. Id. at 632-33 n..
28. Id. at 617; see United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975). See generally 4 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1071 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
29. No. 57,348 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en banc)(not yet reported).
30. Id. at 5. See also Fitzpatrick v. .United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).
31. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
32. Id. at 495.
33. See Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 4 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss3/12

4

White: Failure to Relate Exculpatory Story at Pretrial Hearings May Be U

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

In a vigorous dissent, the minority quoted language from several Supreme Court cases to support their view that it would be fundamentally
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow a defendant's silence at a
pretrial hearing to be used for impeachment purposes at trial.3' The minority reasoned that the value of such silence for impeachment purposes was
outweighed by its prejudicial impact. 35 It was pointed out that the ambiguous nature of post-arrest silence referred to in Doyle applied as well to
silence at pretrial hearings, especially when the pretrial motions were not
3
concerned with questions of guilt or innocence .
It was further argued that the holding placed the defendant upon the
"horns of a dilemma" when trying to determine whether to assert his
fourth amendment rights.3 Simmons v.United States,38 which involved
similar prosecution comments on a defendant's silence at a pretrial hearing, had supposedly resolved this dilemma; however, the majority, it was
felt, would "resurrect it once again to haunt the courtrooms of this
State."" It was reasoned that although there is an obvious difference between Simmons and the case at bar,'" the appellant was relying on the
banc)(not yet reported) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 n.7 (1976)). The textual
sentence to which this footnote is appended reads, "Despite the importance of crossexamination, we have concluded that the Miranda decision compels rejection of the State's
position." The state's position was that the need to present to the jury all information
relevant to the truth of petitioner's exculpatory story fully justifies the cross-examination that
is at issue. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
34. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 11-13 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); accord Willinsky v. State, 360 So. 2d 760, 762
(Fla. 1978) (not material when defendant is silent if privilege attaches at that stage); see
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
35. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 12 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 n.8 (1976);
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975).
36. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 11-12 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976);
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
381 (1968). In Franklinthe hearings were expressly limited by agreement to the adjudication
of issues unrelated to guilt or innocence. See Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 5 (Tex.
Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en banc)(not yet reported).
37. Franklin, v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 15 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); see United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177
(1975); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
38. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
39. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 15 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion).
40. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 12 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382
(1968). In Simmons the prosecution commented on petitioner's testimony during a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence on fourth amendment grounds. In Franklinthe prosecutor commented on defendant's silence during a similar hearing. Both circumstances are covered by
the fifth amendment, in that a defendant does not waive his privilege against self.
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same principle, that is, that the testimony at the pretrial hearings was
limited to issues raised by the motions, and that no questions beyond the
scope of the motions were allowed." The minority also questioned the
validity of the holding under applicable Texas law,'2 reasoning that the
prosecutor's reference to Franklin's failure to relate his exculpatory story

was clearly a comment in violation of article 38.08 of the Texas Code of
3

Criminal Procedure.'
The holding of the court of criminal appeals in Franklin is unsound in
light of prior applicable law." In particular, the court's reliance on Doyle
and Raffel is misplaced. 5 In an effort to apply the law in Doyle to the
instant case, the court culled language from footnotes in Doyle without
referring to the holding or to the policy considerations which supported it."
In Doyle the Court stated that Miranda warnings impliedly assure a defendant that his silence will carry no penalty, and that therefore any postMiranda warning silence would be "insolubly ambiguous."" Given these
considerations, and despite the need for latitude in cross-examinations, it
would be unconscionable to allow the defendant's pretrial silence to be
used to impeach his testimony at trial.'" Although the silence referred to
incrimination when he takes the stand for the purpose of presenting evidence in support of a
motion to suppress. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968). In post-Miranda
decisions, the Supreme Court has held that using a defendant's silence for impeachment
purposes is similarly proscribed by the fifth amendment. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
617 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 389 (1968). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvDENcE § 132 (2d

ed. 1972).
41. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 12 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394
(1968).
42. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 15 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); see Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977); Scroggins v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 573, 576, 263 S.W. 303, 305 (1924); TEx.
CONST. art. I, § 10; TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1966).
43. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 15 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); see TEx. CODE Cram. PRo. ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1966). This article states, "Any defendant in a criminal action shall be permitted to
testify in his own behalf therein, but the failure of any defendant to so testify shall not be
taken as a circumstance against him, nor shall the same be alluded to or commented on by
counsel in the cause." Id.
44. Compare Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24,
1978)(en banc)(not yet reported) with Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) and United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975) and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394
(1968) and Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926).
45. Compare Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 11 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24,
1978)(en banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion) with Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618
(1976) and Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926).
46. See Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 4-5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported).
47. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171,
177 (1975).
48. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
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in Franklin occurred at a pretrial hearing and not at the time of arrest, the
same policy considerations apply. Franklin expressly asserted his fifth
amendment right to remain silent on the issue of guilt at the pretrial
hearings.' Therefore, his situation was similar to that of a defendant who
has just been informed that he had a right to remain silent."
The court's misplaced reliance on Raffel resulted from a failure to distinguish between a defendant's silence at a prior trial and a defendant's
silence at a pretrial hearing." This distinction is crucial. A defendant
would be expected to relate an exculpatory story at a trial when his freedom was at stake, whereas he would not be expected to relate such a story
when it was irrelevant to the issues at hand." The point that the court
overlooked is that in those cases in which the Supreme Court has allowed
a defendant's silence to be used for impeachment purposes, the silence was
either inexplicable under the circumstances," inconsistent with the defendant's prior conduct or statements, 5 or occurred at a time when the defendant had waived his fifth amendment rights." None of these situations
were present in the instant case. 6 Franklin's failure to relate an exculpatory story at the pretrial hearings was understandable in light of the issues
,involved at those hearings. 7 He had previously related his story to the
police, but whether he had or not was irrelevant to the issues at the pretrial
hearings. Thus, his failure to relate it there was not inconsistent; Franklin
49. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 9 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion).
50. If anything, Franklin's silence is less ambiguous and more explicable than that of a
defendant who has just been told he has a right to remain silent. In the latter case, one can
only surmise why the defendant chooses not to speak. Franklin's silence on the issue of guilt
was agreed to by both counsel for the defense and prosecution. The cross-examination was
expressly limited to the scope of the direct examination, thereby encouraging Franklin to
limit the testimony strictly to the subjects under consideration. Thus, there was no reason
for Franklin to relate his exculpatory story at the pretrial hearings since it was irrelevant to
the issues at hand. See Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 12 (Tex. Crim. App. May
24, 1978)(en banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion).
51. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1926); Franklin v. State, No.
57,348, slip op. at 4 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en banc)(not yet reported).
52. Compare Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 4-5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24,
1978)(en banc)(not yet reported) with United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975) and
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1926).
53. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1975). See also Chapman v. United
States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1977)(use of defendant's silence for impeachment is
harmless error).
54. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)(dissenting opinion); see Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189, 195 (1943); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1926).
55. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958); Fitzpatrick v. United States,
178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900). See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW op EVIDENCE §
132 (2d ed. 1972). See also Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 195 (1943); Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494, 496-97 (1926).
56. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 3-9 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported).
57. Id. at 12 (dissenting opinion); see Hale v. United States, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975).
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had expressly not waived his fifth amendment rights with respect to the
issue of guilt, and the prosecutor expressly agreed to limit the scope of the
cross-examination.58 Since Franklindoes not fit any of the exceptions outlined by the Supreme Court, the court of criminal appeals should have
followed the general rule that a defendant's silence may not be used for
impeachment purposes. 5
Furthermore, the decision in Franklindoes not follow the law in Texas."
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant's failure to
testify in his own behalf shall not be "alluded to or commented on" by the
prosecutor.6 ' Although the state could argue that once Franklin took the
stand at the pretrial hearings he entirely waived his privilege, such a blanket waiver rule would discourage accused persons from testifying at all."
Although there are no Texas cases squarely on point, the few cases that
address the general issue whether a defendant's silence may be used for
impeachment favor the position taken by the minority in Franklin.3 In
Dudley v. State" the court of criminal appeals disallowed the use for
impeachment purposes of a defendant's refusal to take a sobriety test. In
a concurring opinion, it was indicated that if a defendant refused to take
the test by standing mute, this silence would not be admissible at trial,
particularly if Miranda warnings had been given. 5 Although clearly distinguishable from Franklin,Dudley strongly supports a defendant's right to
not have his silence used against him at trial.6
58. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 12 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion). See generally C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 132 (2d ed. 1972).
59. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 131, 132 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042

(Chadbourn rev. 1972). In Professor Wigmore's treatise it is suggested that in legal proceedings, omitting what would naturally have been asserted under the circumstances amounts to
an assertion of the non-existence of the fact. Id.
60. See Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)(concurring opinion); Scroggins v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 573, 576, 263 S.W. 303, 305 (1924); TEx. CONST. art.
I, § 10; TEx. CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1966). "It is elementary that a person
arrested upon a charge of crime, and thus accused thereof, has an absolute and inviolable
constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment ... to remain silent." Dudley v. State, 548
S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)(concurring opinion).
61. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1966).
62. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 132 (2d ed. 1972). See Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498 (1926).
63. Compare Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 15 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24,
1978)(en banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion) with Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706,
712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) and Scroggins v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 573, 576, 263 S.W. 303,
305 (1924). In Scroggins questions similar to the ones in the instant case were asked, but the
objections to these questions were sustained. The court still found reversible error stating that
it was prejudicial to ask the questions at all. Id. at 576, 263 S.W. at 305.
64. 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
65. Id. at 711 (concurring opinion of Presiding Judge Onion).
66. See Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 13-15 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24,
1978)(en banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion).
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Additionally, the holding in Franklin is not compatible with the policy
considerations expressed in the post-Miranda Supreme Court decisions
which construe the fifth amendment right to remain silent.67 One such
consideration is that an individual should not be forced to surrender one
constitutional right in order to assert another. The majority in Franklin
implied that the defendant waived his fifth amendment right to remain
silent when he took the stand to assert a fourth amendment claim. 9 Franklin only waived his fifth amendment privilege with respect to the pretrial
motions, one of which was a motion to suppress based on the fourth
amendment. The prosecutor was prohibited from asking questions concerning the issue of guilt, which, therefore, was irrelevant to the agreedupon scope of the pretrial hearings. Thus, it is illogical to hold that Franklin should have told his exculpatory story at these hearings.' To so hold
would be to require a defendant to relate his entire defense each time he
had occasion to speak or face impeachment for his failure to do so.7
The holding in Franklin will significantly narrow the scope of constitutional rights afforded defendants in criminal proceedings in Texas. It is
unlikely that an accused will be willing to assert fourth amendment rights
if by so doing he might be waiving his fifth amendment rights. A defendant
will not know whether to remain silent or to speak lest his silence be
misconstrued. Clearly, a defendant should be under no compulsion to
speak unless he chooses to do so or has otherwise waived his right to remain
silent. To hold otherwise is to seriously abridge a right that is fundamental
to traditional concepts of justice.
Stephen F. White
67. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171,
181 (1975); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). For a discussion of the policy
considerations in Doyle and Hale, see text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
68. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). In Simmons a defendant's
testimony in support of a motion to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds was held

inadmissible on the issue of guilt. Id. at 394.

69. Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 4 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported); see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
70. See Franklin v. State, No. 57,348, slip op. at 12 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 1978)(en
banc)(not yet reported)(dissenting opinion); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976); United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 171 (1975). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE §§ 131-32 (2d ed. 1972).
71. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 118,131-32 (2d ed. 1972).
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